University of Liège, April 23-27, 2012. Room: Monday and Friday: Professors Room (Building A1, 1st floor). Tuesday to Thursday: Philosophy Department Meeting Room (Building A1, 3rd floor).
Phenomenology historically constituted itself, already in the 18th and especially in the late 19th century, as a theory of appearance or subjective experience, as opposed to « objective » sciences. As phenomenologists, Brentano, Stumpf, Husserl and his pupils, Gestalt psychologists were engaged in a unique task, namely that of describing and theorizing phenomenal consciousness. The idea of a theory of phenomenal consciousness, which until recently seemed to have been vanquished by logical empiricism, behaviorism, and naturalism, stands in the foreground of current research in the philosophy of mind. Not only does it give rise to a prolific literature in philosophy and psychology, but it has also become, with Thomas Nagel, one of the central philosophical issues of our time, and the ultimate test for the naturalist paradigm currently dominant in the philosophy of mind. The seminar will address some aspects of phenomenal consciousness, on the basis of the current debates in the philosophy of mind, Austro-German phenomenology (including Brentano and Husserl), and French philosophy.
The two following questions will be discussed:
– The nature of phenomenal consciousness, especially its relationship to
intentionality, inner perception, and introspection. – The possibility and difficulties of a theory of phenomenal consciousness.
Naomi Eilan (University of Warwick) Katalin Farkas (Central European University Budapest) Uriah Kriegel (University of Arizona, Tucson) Steven Laureys (Université de Liège) David Papineau (King’s College London) Gianfranco Soldati (Université de Fribourg)
The seminar is an activity of the FNRS Doctoral School. Organized over a whole week, it aims at stimulating collaborative research, open to original
contributions from Belgian and foreign researchers and academics.
The seminar is free of charge and open to the public without registration.
A. Dewalque: email@example.com
D. Seron: firstname.lastname@example.org
Tel. +32 (0)4 366 55 92 or 93