Two Lectures at Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science – Ghent University, 23/11 & 30/11

Everyone is cordially invited


23 November 4:00 pm
location: Blandijnberg, 2nd floor, room 015
(formerly known as room 216)
Prof. dr. Henry Prakken
Department of Information and Computing Sciences Utrecht University
Faculty of Law, University of Groningen

A formal framework for structured argumentation

Argumentation is currently an important research topic in artificial intelligence. Argumentation is a form of reasoning that makes explicit
the reasons for the conclusions that are drawn and how conflicts between reasons are resolved. This provides a natural mechanism to handle
inconsistent and uncertain information, to explain the results of the reasoning process to humans and to resolve conflicts of opinion between
intelligent agents. A well-known unifying framework for argumentation is Dung’s abstract argumentation. It provides a very elegant way to model the dialectical interaction between abstract arguments given their attack relations, but it says nothing about the structure of arguments or the nature of their attack relations. Much work on these more concrete aspects of argumentation exists but a unifying framework for structured argumentation was long lacking. In this talk I will give an overview of recent work on the ASPCIC+ framework for structured argumentation, which aims to be such a unifying framework. Among the topics to be discussed are closure and consistency properties of argumentation systems and the need to model dynamic aspects of argumentation in terms of structured instead of abstract argumentation.


30 November 4:00 pm
location: Blandijnberg, 2nd floor, room 015
(formerly known as room 216)
dr. Holger Andreas
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

Paraconsistent Concept Formation in Structuralist Framework

The formation of a theoretical concept is brought about by establishing axioms of a scientific theory that determine the meaning of
that concept. We are familiar with this idea from the work of Carnap and others. All formal accounts, however, of the formation of theoretical
concepts assume the corresponding scientific theory to be fully consistent with all related theories in all applications. This condition is rarely met, even by highly successful theories. Hence, a formal account of paraconsist concept formation is needed. I shall devise such an account using a structuralist approach to belief revision. In doing so, I shall address the more general problem of a logical analysis of
paraconsistent reasoning in science.

dr. Giuseppe Primiero Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science Ghent



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